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CHOOSE YOUR OWN PATH: A DEFENDANT’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
People v. Crampe1 
(decided October 13, 2011) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals reviewed two cas-
es, People v. Crampe2 and People v. Wingate,3 which were consoli-
dated for a determination on whether defendants properly waived 
their right to legal counsel. 
In Crampe, the defendant was convicted of “criminal posses-
sion of a controlled substance” in the seventh-degree after conducting 
his own defense.4  He appealed the conviction to the appellate court 
and the decision was affirmed.5  The appellate court held that the trial 
court had adequately cautioned the defendant about the inherent risks 
of self-representation and the significance of being represented by le-
gal counsel.6  The court further found that, based on the defendant’s 
arrest and conviction records, it was clear that he was familiar with 
the workings of the adversarial system.7 
Subsequently, the defendant appealed his conviction to the 
Court of Appeals.8  The court ruled that the trial court had failed to 
conduct the searching inquiry necessary to ensure that the defendant 
was cognizant of the dangers of self-representation, prior to allowing 
 
1 957 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 2011). 
2 907 N.Y.S.2d 102 (App. Term 2010). 
3 892 N.Y.S.2d 867 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2010). 
4 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 257, 258. 
5 Id. at 258. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. at 256-57. 
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him to proceed pro se.9  As a result, the court ordered a new trial.10 
In Wingate, the defendant was convicted of “fourth-degree 
criminal possession of stolen property and seventh-degree criminal 
possession of a controlled substance.”11  He appealed the conviction 
to the appellate division, where the conviction for “possession of sto-
len property” was reversed and the charge dismissed from the indict-
ment; however, the rest of the decision was affirmed.12  The court de-
termined that the defendant had properly waived his right to counsel 
even though the suppression court that had allowed him to waive the 
right had not conducted the proper inquiry prior to allowing him to do 
so.13  Upon review by the Court of Appeals, the appellate court’s rul-
ing was modified and the case remitted to the lower court for a “new 
suppression hearing.”14  The Court of Appeals directed that if the de-
fendant prevailed at the new hearing, a new trial was to be granted, 
but if the prosecution prevailed, the judgment was to be amended as 
such.15 
Though the requisite steps to be taken by a court prior to al-
lowing a defendant to waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se 
are well established in the New York courts, this Note will analyze 
whether the decision in Crampe and those of its predecessors are 
consistent with their federal counterparts. 
II. THE OPINION: PEOPLE V. CRAMPE 
A. Crampe 
Defendant Crampe was arrested and brought up on charges of 
“seventh-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance” for 
his alleged possession of a vial of phencyclidine (“PCE”).16  At a pre-
liminary hearing, the defendant advised the town justice that he had 
not retained an attorney for representation.17  When asked if he 
 
9 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 263. 
10 Id. at 265. 
11 Id. at 258, 262. 
12 Id. at 262. 
13 Id. 
14 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 265. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 257. 
17 Id. 
2
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wished to proceed pro se, he responded “I guess[ ] so, your Honor.”18  
Thereafter, the judge provided him with a pretrial order advising him 
of his right to counsel and reviewed it with him.19  The judge in-
formed him that failure to accept the recommendation to the Legal 
Aid Society would constitute both a waiver of his right to representa-
tion by an attorney and an election to continue pro se.20  The judge 
further advised him to be prepared for trial on the next scheduled date 
and that failure to “appear” with counsel would constitute an “ac-
knowledgment of the advice and warnings” of the court with regard 
to the right to counsel.21  The defendant signed the order, and as he 
left, the judge advised him to get an attorney.22  At trial, he proceeded 
pro se with counsel standing by for assistance.23  The jury found him 
guilty and he was sentenced to six months in jail.24 
On appeal, the judgment was affirmed, with the court decid-
ing that the town court had adequately warned the defendant of the 
importance of representation by legal counsel and the disadvantages 
associated with self-representation.25  The court stated that the de-
fendant’s previous arrests and convictions were evidence that he was 
familiar with the way the criminal justice system operated.26  On the 
subsequent appeal, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the appellate 
court.27  It found that the trial court’s inquiry was insufficient to satis-
fy the searching inquiry necessary prior to allowing the defendant to 
represent himself.28 
B. Wingate 
Defendant Wingate was arrested and charged with “fourth-
degree criminal possession of stolen property and seventh-degree 
criminal possession of a controlled substance,” after police discov-
 
18 Id. 
19 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 257. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 257-58. 
23 Id. at 258. 
24 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 258. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 258. 
27 Id. at 263. 
28 Id. 
3
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ered him in a stolen van with a crack pipe in his pocket.29  The de-
fendant was initially assigned an attorney, but his attorney was later 
relieved after the defendant threatened to make a report “to the griev-
ance committee.”30  The court assigned a new attorney, but the de-
fendant asked to proceed pro se with newly appointed counsel 
providing assistance, if required.31  The judge advised the defendant 
to first consult with his attorney, but he neglected to do so.32  At the 
next appearance, the attorney asked to be relieved because the de-
fendant no longer desired her representation and their communication 
was ineffective.33 
The defendant told the judge that the attorney had tried to 
convince him to change his defense strategy.34  When the judge asked 
if he wished to represent himself at the suppression hearing, he an-
swered in the affirmative, but requested an attorney’s assistance as he 
had done before.35  The judge explained to him that he was not enti-
tled to “hybrid representation” and again asked him if he wished to 
proceed pro se.36  The defendant again responded in the affirmative.37  
The judge then went through a series of questions to ensure that the 
defendant understood his request, and granted him permission to rep-
resent himself.38 
At the suppression hearing that same day, the officer in 
charge made a recommendation that the defendant’s motion be de-
nied and the evidence of the crack pipe be admitted, as well as state-
ments he made to police.39  When the case went back to the trial 
court, the judge adopted the recommendations of the hearing officer 
and the defendant’s motion was denied.40  Five months later at trial, 
another judge went over the defendant’s lack of legal representation 
again.41  He spoke to the defendant about a deal he had refused for a 
 










39 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 258-59. 
40 Id. at 259. 
41 Id. 
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minimum sentence of one and one-half to three years and about the 
fact that he was now facing fifteen years to life if convicted and sen-
tenced as a persistent felon.42  Further, the judge stressed that based 
upon his years of experience, his recommendation was that the de-
fendant not proceed pro se.43  In response, the defendant informed the 
judge that he had studied law for ten to twelve years on the street and 
in libraries, and had received legal research certificates.44 
The defendant’s motion for a speedy trial was denied, and 
again, when his case was called for trial, the same judge asked him if 
he had considered representation by an attorney.45  He responded that 
he still wished to proceed pro se.46  Prior to allowing him to proceed, 
the judge appointed standby counsel to assist him and went through a 
series of questions with regard to the defendant’s academic record, 
work history and his knowledge about “the criminal justice sys-
tem.”47  The judge also inquired as to whether the defendant had been 
“coerced or threatened” or influenced in any way to proceed pro se.48  
He went over the fact that most pro se defendants are unsuccessful 
and that he would be held to the same expectations as an attorney.49  
The case then went to trial and the defendant was convicted and sen-
tenced to a term of two to four years.50 
The defendant appealed his conviction and the Appellate Di-
vision, Second Department affirmed the trial court’s decision with re-
spect to the defendant’s waiver of counsel.51  The court, after a re-
view of the complete record, concluded that even though the 
suppression court had not conducted a proper waiver colloquy, the 
record demonstrated that the defendant had properly waived his right 
to legal representation and had voluntarily chosen self-
representation.52 




44 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 259. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 259-60. 
47 Id. at 260. 
48 Id. 
49 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 261. 
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jected the appellate court’s ruling.53  It found that the colloquy by the 
suppression court was insufficient because it had merely informed the 
defendant of the risk of being convicted of a felony, but had not ade-
quately warned him of the pitfalls and difficulties inherent with self-
representation.54  The court also observed that, though the colloquy 
conducted by the trial court was sufficient because it was extensive 
and notified the defendant of the challenges inherent in proceeding 
pro se, the warnings to defendant were “incapable of retrospectively” 
correcting the error made by the suppression court.55 
III. THE FEDERAL APPROACH 
Under the federal approach, the issue of waiver of the right to 
counsel is marginally different from the New York state approach.  
Under federal law, a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel is 
protected by the Sixth Amendment.56  This right developed and was 
enumerated in the Sixth Amendment as a means of countering the 
prosecution’s advantage of familiarity with courtroom procedures 
and the criminal adjudication process.57  As a result, it has been clear-
ly established that this all-important right must extend through all the 
critical stages of a trial.58  Due to the importance of this safeguard, 
waiver of the right must be intentionally relinquished or abandoned 
and acquiescence is not usually presumed as waiver.59 
The federal approach requires that waiver be made knowing-
ly, intelligently, and with an awareness of the possible negative con-
sequences of such a decision.60  A defendant need not have the same 
level of knowledge and experience as an attorney to waive this 
right.61  An intelligent waiver is considered one where the defendant 
 
53 Id. at 257. 
54 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 263. 
55 Id. at 263-64. 
56 Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004). 
57 See ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 4 (1992) (stating that the right to counsel 
evolved because the prosecutor had “great power” because he was familiar with criminal 
procedure, juries, and officers of the court). 
58 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 80-81. 
59 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
60 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81.  See also Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 
275 (1942) (stating that a defendant may “competently and intelligently” waive his right to 
counsel). 
61 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 89. 
6
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makes the choice knowing “what he is doing and his choice is made 
with eyes wide open.”62  In order to ascertain whether a defendant is 
making the decision knowingly and intelligently, a federal court is 
required to conduct a colloquy with the defendant.63  The standard 
employed for the colloquy is less stringent for the earlier stages of the 
criminal process and more rigorous for proceeding to trial.64  If a de-
fendant decides to collaterally attack a conviction, he bears the bur-
den of proving that he did not effectively waive his right to counsel.65 
A. Supreme Court Cases 
One of the earliest cases in which the Supreme Court dealt 
with a defendant’s right to counsel was Powell v. Alabama.66  In 
Powell, three black youths were convicted and sentenced to death for 
the rape of two white girls.67  The issue before the Court was whether 
the defendants’ constitutional right to a fair trial was violated by the 
denial of legal representation.68 
The defendants’ trials, which began six days after the indict-
ments, were all completed in one day and without representation by 
legal counsel.69  An out-of-state attorney appeared at the trials and in-
formed the court that he had not been retained, but was appearing out 
of courtesy to assist whomever the court assigned.70  He informed the 
court that he had not had sufficient time to prepare for trial and was 
not familiar with Alabama procedure.71  Another attorney from the 
local bar had also stepped forward and volunteered to assist;72 how-
ever, the court never formally appointed counsel to represent the de-
fendants.73 
On the question of legal representation, the Supreme Court 
 
62 Id. at 88 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279). 
63 Id. at 89. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 92. 
66 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
67 Id. at 49, 50.  On appeal, defendants also claimed that they were not afforded a “fair, 
impartial and deliberate trial” and that the trial was presided over by a jury not consisting of 
members of their race.  Id. at 50. 
68 Id. at 52. 
69 Id. at 50, 53. 
70 Powell, 287 U.S. at 53. 
71 Id. at 55. 
72 Id. at 56. 
73 Id. 
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recognized that the Sixth Amendment established that all criminal de-
fendants had a right to be represented by legal counsel.74  The Court 
went on to conclude that the state court’s failure to allow the defend-
ants sufficient time and an opportunity to secure counsel was a viola-
tion of their due process rights.75  The Court further emphasized that 
when a defendant is unable to retain counsel for his defense and he is 
incapable of conducting his own defense, the court is required to ap-
pointment counsel on his behalf.76 
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst,77 the Supreme Court re-
affirmed the Sixth Amendment’s protection of a defendant’s right to 
counsel and established the criteria by which federal courts were to 
evaluate a defendant’s waiver.78  In Zerbst, the defendant, unrepre-
sented by counsel, was convicted of a felony for uttering, passing, 
and possessing counterfeit currency.79  The Court in its decision 
stressed the importance of protecting a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
right, stating that “[t]he Sixth Amendment stands as a constant ad-
monition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, jus-
tice will not” be done.80  The case was remanded to the district court 
for review and instructions were given that if the defendant met his 
burden of showing that he did not “competently and intelligently” 
waive his right to counsel, his petition for habeas corpus was to be 
granted.81 
The Court in Zerbst observed that the protections enshrined in 
the Sixth Amendment exist because the average citizen does not pos-
sess the legal skill necessary to defend against a claim by the trained 
and experienced prosecution that could deprive him of his life or lib-
 
74 Id. at 66. 
75 Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. 
76 Id.  See GARCIA, supra note 57, at 5 (finding that the court in Powell broadened the 
scope of Sixth Amendment protection to include the appointment of counsel). 
77 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
78 See GARCIA, supra note 57, at 6 (stating that Zerbst widened the parameters of Powell 
by setting forth standards for effective waiver of counsel). 
79 Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 459-60.  The defendant was arrested along with another perpetrator, 
Bridwell.  Id. at 459.  Both men were enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and were on 
leave at the time.  Id. at 460.  Both men lived in other states and had no friends, relatives, or 
acquaintances in the trial state.  Id.  Both had limited education and no money.  Id.  Both 
were represented by counsel in preliminary hearings but informed the court at their arraign-
ment that they did not have legal counsel.  Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 460.  However, they respond-
ed in the affirmative when asked if they were prepared for trial.  Id. 
80 Id. at 462. 
81 Id. at 469. 
8
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erty.82  The court emphasized that self-representation may put the de-
fendant at a disadvantage because he may not know “the rules of evi-
dence,” and thus, may be improperly charged and convicted with im-
proper or inadmissible evidence.83 
In Faretta v. California,84 the court further clarified and solid-
ified the federal approach to the issue of waiver.  Even though the 
court’s main focus was a defendant’s right to conduct his own de-
fense, the decision had important and far-reaching implications for 
the question of waiver, as proper waiver of the right to counsel is a 
prerequisite to self-representation. 
The Court in Faretta announced that the Sixth Amendment’s 
right to counsel also encompassed an inextricable right to conduct 
one’s own defense.85  Operating under this construct, the Court found 
that the trial court had violated the defendant’s constitutional right by 
denying him the opportunity to represent himself after he “had clearly 
and unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to repre-
sent himself and did not want counsel.”86  The Court held that the 
waiver was valid because the defendant was “literate,” “competent,” 
and knew that he was voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and 
choosing self-representation.87  The Court pointed out that the de-
fendant’s understanding of the rules of the judicial system was irrele-
vant to his waiver.88  However, the dissent in Faretta questioned 
whether every defendant, “even the most uneducated and inexperi-
enced,” should be able to insist upon self-representation when 
charged with a crime.89  This question strikes at the delicate balance 
between a defendant’s interest in deciding his own destiny and the 
government’s countervailing interest in affording every citizen a fair 
trial. 
On one hand, it could be asserted that in actuality, a defendant 
with less education will probably be affected more adversely by the 
criminal justice system than a defendant with more education, and 
thus, contrary to the dissent’s view, would require more protection.  
 
82 Id. at 462-63. 
83 Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 463. 
84 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
85 Id. at 821. 
86 Id. at 835, 836. 
87 Id. at 835. 
88 Id. at 836. 
89 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836 (Burger, J., dissenting). 
9
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This is because he is more likely to engage in activity that will cause 
interaction with the criminal justice system.  A defendant has a strong 
interpersonal interest in determining his fate no matter his level of 
education because the criminal adjudication process could ultimately 
rob him of his liberty and have a profound impact on his life. 
On the other hand, the government’s countervailing interest in 
affording every defendant a fair trial is just as worthy of considera-
tion as a defendant’s interests.  The government has a valid interest in 
the public’s continued trust, respect, and confidence in the judicial 
system.90  Citizens need to believe that courts will protect their inter-
est even when they may be in a compromised and vulnerable posi-
tion.  This is the very reason why the Sixth Amendment was institut-
ed—to ensure that all citizens had the basic right and that the right 
would not arbitrarily be dispensed.  Delving into a defendant’s back-
ground and level of education is a very delicate issue and could likely 
result in arbitrary judgments especially in circumstances where there 
is no immediate quantifiable level of education. 
Later, in Patterson v. Illinois,91 the Court distinguished be-
tween the constitutional minimum of a waiver at the pretrial stage of 
the criminal process and waiver during trial.  There, the Court was 
called upon to decide whether the post-indictment interrogation of a 
defendant without the presence of an attorney violated his constitu-
tional right.92  The Court established that Miranda warnings satisfy 
the constitutional minimum of informing a defendant of his right to 
counsel during post-indictment questioning, and thus, provide a suffi-
cient basis for satisfying the knowing and intelligent components of a 
constitutional waiver at the pretrial stage.93 
In Patterson, the defendant, a member of a street gang, was 
convicted of the murder of a rival gang member who was found dead 
after being involved in an altercation with defendant’s gang.94  The 
defendant voluntarily answered questions at the time of his arrest and 
reviewed and signed a Miranda waiver.95  He later moved to suppress 
 
90 See GARCIA, supra note 57, at 16 (stating that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the 
importance of the assistance of counsel to the adversarial process). 
91 487 U.S. 285 (1988). 
92 Id. at 287. 
93 Id. at 300. 
94 Id. at 287, 289. 
95 Id. at 287, 288.  Pre-indictment, the defendant gave a statement about the initial fight 
between the gangs and denied any involvement in the victim’s death.  Patterson, 487 U.S. at 
287.  However, after indictment, the defendant gave statements describing his role in the 
10
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his statements to the police claiming they had been obtained in an un-
constitutional manner.96  The Court found that the Miranda warnings 
provided to the defendant were sufficient for a proper waiver as he 
had been informed of his right to have an attorney present during 
questioning and that if he could not afford one, the court would ap-
point one.97  In its decision, the Court differentiated between waiver 
during post-indictment questioning and waiver during trial.98  The 
Court emphasized that the less stringent standard during post-
indictment questioning exists because the risks a defendant faces are 
more obvious than at trial and there is also a less substantial risk of 
exposure to the “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation” 
during post-indictment questioning.99 
Recently, in Iowa v. Tovar,100 the Supreme Court affirmed the 
relevance of the requirements for the constitutional waiver of the 
right to legal counsel.  There, the defendant was arrested for “operat-
ing a motor vehicle” while intoxicated (“OWI”).101  He subsequently 
signed a form waiving his right to counsel while being questioned by 
the police.102 
At an initial hearing, the defendant waived his application for 
a court-appointed attorney.103  At his arraignment, he informed the 
judge that he wished to represent himself and subsequently pled 
guilty to the charge.104  Prior to granting the request, the court con-
ducted a colloquy and informed the defendant that he was entitled to 
legal representation and a speedy public trial by a jury.105  The court 
advised the defendant that if he waived his right to counsel and repre-
sented himself he would lose the right to remain silent at trial, the 
right to the presumption of innocence, and the right to subpoena wit-
nesses.106  He was also informed of the maximum and minimum pen-
 
murder.  Id. at 288. 
96 Id. at 289. 
97 Id. at 293. 
98 Id. at 299. 
99 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 299-300. 
100 541 U.S. 77 (2004). 
101 Id. at 81-82.  The defendant was a college student at the time of his arrest.  Id. at 81.  
His blood alcohol level was 0.194 at the time of his arrest.  Id. at 82. 
102 Id. 
103 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 82. 
104 Id. at 82. 
105 Id. at 83. 
106 Id. 
11
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alty his charge carried.107  The defendant affirmed to the court that he 
understood the risks he was undertaking and that he still wished to 
proceed pro se.108   
Thereafter, the defendant was charged with a second OWI, 
but was represented by counsel at that trial.109  When the defendant 
was charged with a third OWI in addition to driving with a suspended 
license (which ranked as a class D felony), he filed a motion of law 
points to prevent his first OWI conviction from being used to en-
hance the current charge.110  He claimed that his waiver of counsel 
was invalid because it had not met constitutional requirements.111  
The trial court denied his motion and he was subsequently convict-
ed.112 
In turn, the Supreme Court remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings because it found that the state’s formal admonitions to the 
defendant were not clearly sufficient to inform the defendant of the 
dangers and disadvantages of waiver.113  The Court reaffirmed the 
precedent that the information to be communicated to a defendant 
prior to an intelligent waiver varies according to the “facts and cir-
cumstances” of the case.114  It clarified that a “scripted” formal in-
quiry was not required for constitutional waiver even though states 
are free to mandate such inquiries.115  The Court further stated that 
the requirements of a knowing and intelligent waiver are satisfied 
where the court apprises the defendant of the “nature of the charges” 
he faces, the right to speak to an attorney regarding his plea, and the 




108 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 83, 84. 
109 Id. at 85. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 86.  The defendant was sentenced to 180 days in jail, three years probation and 
leveled a fine of $2,500 plus costs and surcharges for the third OWI offense.  Tovar, 541 
U.S. at 86.  He received thirty days in jail to run concurrently with the OWI sentence and a 
$500 fine for driving with a suspended license.  Id. 
113 Id. at 93. 
114 Id. at 92. 
115 Id. at 92, 94. 
116 Tovar, 541 U.S. at 81. 
12
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B. Circuit Split 
While the Faretta decision established the standard that a 
court must satisfy prior to allowing a defendant to proceed pro se, it 
did not set out a specific test or set of rules to be met to satisfy this 
standard.117  Since Faretta, the federal circuit courts have been split 
with regard to the procedure to be used to establish that a defendant’s 
waiver of counsel is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.118  Most cir-
cuits seem to favor a less formal approach,
 
while others seem to pre-
fer a more formal one.119  The Second Circuit endorses a less formal 
 
117 See, e.g., Swiger v. Brown, 86 Fed. App’x. 877, 881 (6th Cir. 2004) (acknowledging 
that federal appeals courts have concluded that “Faretta does not clearly establish that for-
mal warnings by the trial court are required to establish a knowing, voluntary and intelligent 
waiver of the right to counsel”). 
118 Cf. United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245, 249 (6th Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that 
since Faretta, many courts have “addressed the question of the type of record necessary” to 
establish waiver but there is a split in the circuit courts); accord, Brian H. Wright, Comment, 
The Formal Inquiry Approach: Balancing a Defendant’s Right to Proceed Pro Se with a De-
fendant’s Right to Assistance of Counsel, 76 MARQ. L. REV. 785 (1993) (stating that there 
has been a split in the federal circuit courts of appeal with regard to constitutional waiver of 
the right to counsel). 
119 See United States v. Benson 686 F.3d 498, 503 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that the de-
fendant’s waiver was proper after observing that both the prosecution and the court had noti-
fied and repeatedly warned the defendant of the disadvantages and difficulties he would face 
if he chose to conduct his own defense, and also recognizing that the defendant had been 
specifically advised that he would be required to follow the “Federal Rules of Evidence and 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure”); Jones v. Walker, 540 F.3d 1277, 1293 (11th Cir. 
2008) (finding that the validity of waiver of counsel does not depend upon the adequacy of a 
trial court’s warnings but is based on whether the defendant understood the choices present-
ed and the danger of proceeding pro se and thus the warnings can be promulgated on a col-
loquy with the court or counsel or through the defendant’s own experience); Mallard v. Cain, 
515 F.3d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 2008) (establishing that the Fifth Circuit follows the guidelines 
set out in Tovar that no formal or scripted colloquy is necessary for constitutional waiver; all 
that is required is informing the defendant of the right to counsel, the nature of the charges, 
and the range of sentencing); Maynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 665 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating 
that the validity of a waiver depends on the totality of the circumstances which is inclusive 
of the defendant’s background, experience, and conduct); United States v. Frechette, 456 
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2006) (stating that waiver is constitutional when the court informs the 
defendant of the right to counsel, the nature of the charges against him, and the possible pun-
ishment); Thomas v. United States, 357 F.3d 357, 364 (3d. Cir. 2004) (stating that the Third 
Circuit has suggested a set of questions to provide a framework for determining whether a 
defendant understands the risk of proceeding pro se, but not mandating their use); Lopez v. 
Thompson, 202 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has suggest-
ed, but not mandated, a specific procedure to be followed to determine waiver of the right to 
counsel, and ordering its courts to inform a defendant in open court of the dangers of pro-
ceeding pro se and the nature of the charges and the possible penalties); United States v. 
Singleton, 107 F.2d 1091, 1097-98 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that the Fourth Circuit is in 
agreement with a majority of circuits and does not require a precise procedure to be followed 
to determine waiver of the right to counsel and endorses “open court exploration of the de-
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inquiry that seeks to establish a defendant’s waiver based on a view 
of the entire record.120  In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has taken a 
stricter approach requiring that the court perform a detailed in-
quiry.121 
In Torres v. United States,122 the Second Circuit dealt with the 
issue of whether a defendant properly waived her right to legal coun-
sel when she refused to participate in her trial and sentencing hear-
ing.123  In Torres, the defendant, a self-proclaimed Puerto Rican free-
dom fighter, was implicated in the bombing of a building in New 
York City, which killed one man and injured several others.124 
During the trial, the defendant refused the court’s appoint-
ment of counsel, requested to represent herself, and refused to con-
duct a defense or participate in the trial.125  Throughout the trial, the 
court informed the defendant of her right to counsel and the conse-
quences associated with waiver.126  The defendant insisted on repre-
senting herself and not participating in the proceedings.127  She was 
convicted and subsequently refused to participate in her sentencing 
hearing.128  She was eventually sentenced to life in prison.129  The de-
fendant did not appeal the conviction or sentence until fifteen years 
later, when she claimed that her Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
had been violated.130 
The Second Circuit, in reviewing the defendant’s claim, con-
 
fendant’s background and capabilities and understanding of the dangers and disadvantages 
of self-representation”); United States v. Sandles, 23 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating 
that the Seventh Circuit endorses a “thorough and formal inquiry” though it stops “short of 
ruling that a scanty inquiry, by itself, automatically establishes constitutional error” and in-
stead looks at the whole record to determine whether a defendant properly waived the right 
to counsel). 
120 See infra notes 122-58. 
121 See infra notes 159-84. 
122 140 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 1998). 
123 Id. at 395. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 396.  The court advised the defendant that her interests would be better served if 
she was represented by an attorney during jury selection, testimony, admission of evidence, 
and the prosecution’s opening and closing arguments.  Torres, 140 F.3d at 396.  The defend-
ant acknowledged her right to counsel on April 16, 1980 and again on May 5, 1980.  Id. at 
401. 
127 Id. at 396. 
128 Id. at 395. 
129 Id 
130 Torres, 140 F.3d at 395.  The defendant also claimed that her Fifth and Eight Amend-
ment rights were violated.  Id. 
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sidered whether she had: (i) understood that she had a choice in ac-
cepting assigned counsel or self-representation; (ii) comprehended 
the advantages and disadvantages of legal representation; and (iii) 
had the capacity to intelligently waive her right.131  The court held 
that the record contained sufficient proof that the defendant had made 
a knowing and intelligent waiver.132  The court further stated that it 
was satisfied that the district court had established that the defendant 
“understood her rights, knew her options, was aware of the risks and 
voluntarily waived her right to counsel.”133  The court expressed that 
“there is no dispute that district courts must” assure that a defendant 
is aware of the dangers and pitfalls associated with proceeding pro 
se.134  It further acknowledged that a defendant’s refusal to participate 
at trial might make it more difficult to determine whether the right to 
counsel was properly waived, but pointed out that the proper Faretta 
inquiry should be whether the defendant had the capacity and 
knowledge to rationally choose waiver.135 
The Second Circuit again dealt with the issue of waiver in 
Dallio v. Spitzer.136  There, the court acknowledged that the federal 
approach had not clearly established the precedent that a court must 
“explicitly warn a defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of pro-
ceeding pro se.”137  In Dallio, the defendant was convicted in New 
York state court of second-degree murder, first-degree robbery and 
second-degree criminal weapon possession after he shot and killed a 
young woman during an armed robbery.138  The defendant filed a pe-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was subsequently denied by 
the district court.139 
The district court found that the state trial court had not 
properly informed the defendant of the “dangers and disadvantages” 
of proceeding pro se as required by Faretta; however, the court con-
cluded that the error was not reversible because the defendant had the 
 
131 Id. at 401. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Torres, 140 F.3d at 402. 
135 Id. at 401, 402. 
136 343 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 2003). 
137 Id. at 561. 
138 Id. at 555.  The victim received three gunshot wounds in the process of the robbery, 
one to the chest and three to the head.  Id. 
139 Id. 
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assistance of standby counsel.140  The defendant subsequently ap-
pealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that a violation of his Sixth 
Amendment right to legal representation had occurred when he was 
allowed to proceed pro se at a suppression hearing, without being 
warned about the dangers and pitfalls of self-representation.141 
At a post indictment hearing, the defendant moved to suppress 
incriminating statements made to detectives in an interview after he 
waived his Miranda rights by claiming that he had not properly 
waived his right to counsel.142  During the hearing, the defendant’s 
attorney informed the court that his client wished to proceed pro se 
and that he had thoroughly discussed the decision with him and had 
concluded that he was competent to make such a decision.143  The 
court then permitted the defendant to proceed pro se with his attorney 
as standby counsel after asking him if he was ready to proceed and he 
responded in the affirmative.144 
While the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction, it did so 
without reaching the question of harmless error.145  The court 
acknowledged that while explicit warnings about the “dangers and 
disadvantages” of proceeding pro se were “advisable,” they were not 
a minimum requirement for constitutional waiver.146  The court em-
phasized that it interpreted the part of the Faretta decision concerning 
warnings as “dictum,” and therefore, not clearly established law.147 
Even within the Second Circuit there is disagreement between 
the judges as to what level of inquiry satisfies the warning require-
ment.  In a concurring opinion by Judge Katzmann, he acknowledged 
that even though he agreed with the majority’s decision he arrived 
there by means of a different analysis.148  He rejected the majority’s 
finding that clear federal law had not established the requirement that 
a court must inform a defendant of the “dangers and disadvantages” 
of proceeding pro se.149  Judge Katzmann reasoned that the warning 
requirement for a knowing waiver in Faretta was not dictum because 
 
140 Dallio, 343 F.3d at 555. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 555, 556. 
143 Id. at 556. 
144 Id. at 557. 
145 Dallio, 343 F.3d at 555. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 561, 562. 
148 Id. at 565 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
149 Id. 
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it was essential to Faretta’s knowing relinquishment of his right to 
counsel.150  He further advanced the idea that, because a defendant 
must properly waive his right to counsel prior to being allowed to 
proceed pro se, the Supreme Court must have decided that Faretta’s 
knowing inquiry was sufficient, otherwise, it would not have made 
the determination that his Sixth Amendment right of self-
representation had been violated.151 
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Duty,152 upon review-
ing the entire record, held that the defendant had properly waived his 
right to counsel even though the court had not specifically examined 
the defendant and advised him of the dangers and pitfalls of proceed-
ing pro se.153  The facts in Duty involved a defendant who was con-
victed of “illegal sale of amphetamine hydrochloride.”154  During the 
trial, the defendant’s privately hired counsel requested to be relieved 
after the defendant asked to conduct his own defense.155  Prior to 
granting the defendant’s waiver and ordering counsel to remain on 
standby, the judge ascertained that the defendant was twenty-seven 
and was only three credits shy of being awarded a “B.S. degree in 
Chemistry at Kent State University.”156 
The Second Circuit concluded that the defendant had “made it 
clear” that he wished to conduct his own defense despite the presence 
of a competent attorney.157  The court further stated that a court must 
respect a defendant’s right to waive counsel and proceed pro se if he 
is aware of his rights and the ramifications of waiving those rights.158 
The Sixth Circuit in United States v. McDowell,159 in an effort 
to avoid a deluge of appeals based on a defendant’s claim of invalid 
waiver, adopted a formal inquiry to be used by the district court when 
deciding whether to allow a defendant to proceed pro se.160  The court 
established a set of questions (a model inquiry) adopted from the 1 
BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES §§ 1.02-2 (3d ed. 
 
150 Dallio, 343 F.3d at 566 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
151 Id. 
152 447 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1971). 
153 Id. at 451. 
154 Id. at 450. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Duty, 447 F.2d at 450. 
158 Id. 
159 814 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1987). 
160 Id. at 249-50. 
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1986), to be asked by Sixth Circuit district judges prior to allowing a 
defendant to waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se.161  In 
McDowell, the defendant was arrested for his involvement in a coun-
terfeiting scheme.162  The defendant’s attorney, at the final pretrial 
hearing, informed the court that his client wished to invoke his right 
to self-representation.163  The defendant went on to represent himself 
at trial and was subsequently convicted.164  The defendant later ap-
pealed the decision to the appeals court claiming that his waiver was 
not made knowingly and intelligently.165 
Upon reviewing the trial record, the court concluded that there 
was sufficient evidence to show that the defendant “understood the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.”166  Though the 
court in McDowell instituted the formal procedure to be used in de-
termining whether the searching inquiry requirement was satisfied, it 
decided the defendant’s appeal based on a review of the entire rec-
ord.167  The court explained that it was clear that the defendant was 
familiar with the criminal justice system, aware of his right to coun-
sel, was not forced to continue with counsel he considered incompe-
tent, and not forced to immediately proceed pro se.168  The court fur-
ther explained that the new requirements were only to be used for 
future cases.169 
In a strong concurring opinion, Judge Engel acknowledged 
the dual problems posed by the right to counsel and the right to self-
representation.  There, he discussed his interpretation of the defend-
ant’s behavior as an attempt to “manipulate” the system.170  He ex-
plained that although he was reluctant to endorse a rigid formula for 
deciding whether a defendant had validly waived his right to counsel, 
the repeated abuse of the Sixth Amendment right by defendants re-
 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 246.  The defendant’s wife was also arrested at the same time on the same charg-
es.  Id.  Both the defendant and his wife fled the country after being released on bond.  
McDowell, 814 F.2d at 246.  They were subsequently arrested in Canada and returned to the 
United States where they were immediately indicted.  Id. at 246-47. 
163 Id. at 247. 
164 Id. at 246, 247. 
165 Id. at 248. 
166 McDowell, 814 F.2d at 249. 
167 Id. at 249-50. 
168 Id. at 249. 
169 Id. at 250. 
170 Id. at 252 (Engel, J., concurring). 
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quired attention.171  He conceded that the questions laid out in the 1 
BENCH BOOK FOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES are an effective 
response to the problem and an effective way of avoiding procedural 
error which is “the least useful and productive” grounds for an ap-
peal.172 
The Sixth Circuit, in Fowler v. Collins,173 adhered to the more 
stringent interpretation of the Faretta standard, where a formal collo-
quy was used to decide whether the defendant had properly waived 
his right to an attorney.  The court mentioned factors—such as the 
severity of the charges and the possible punishment—that a court 
should delve into before making the decision.174  The court also stated 
that “a judge must thoroughly investigate the circumstances under 
which waiver is made.”175 
In Fowler, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to 
twenty-four years in prison for theft by deception and passing bad 
checks, after representing himself at trial.176  The court concluded that 
the defendant had not properly waived his right to counsel because 
the trial court had not satisfied its duty of apprising the defendant of 
the dangers and disadvantages of self-representing.177  The court ex-
plained that the trial court had only conducted a “cursory investiga-
tion” as to whether the defendant had met the high standard set out in 
Faretta, before allowing him to proceed pro se.178  The court further 
pointed out that the judge at the defendant’s arraignment had only 
once inquired whether the defendant wished to proceed pro se and 
waive the explanation of other relevant processes.179  The court ex-
pressed that an affirmation by the defendant that he is aware of his 
right to counsel and his intention to proceed pro se does not end the 
courts obligation to ensure that the waiver is being made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.180 
Recently, in United States v. McBride,181 the Sixth Circuit af-
 
171 McDowell, 814 F.2d at 252 (Engel, J., concurring). 
172 Id. 
173 253 F.3d 244 (6th Cir. 2001). 
174 Id. at 249. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 246. 
177 Id. at 250. 
178 Fowler, 253 F.3d at 250. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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firmed the use of the formal inquiry by acknowledging that a district 
court does not have to strictly adhere to the inquiry.182  The circuit 
court concluded that though the model inquiry consisted of a “strong-
ly worded admonishment” and thirteen questions, and the district 
court only asked the defendant twelve of those questions, the district 
substantially complied “with the essence” of the model inquiry, and 
thus, had satisfied the requisite inquiry for a knowing and intelligent 
waiver.183  It explained that this was as a result of the district court 
having reviewed a substantial amount of information with the de-
fendant.184 
Another problem stemming from the issue of waiver under 
the federal system is whether the court in Faretta clearly established 
that warnings of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation 
are required for a valid waiver.  The circuits are split on the issue, 
with some interpreting Faretta as clearly establishing the need for 
such warnings and others arriving at the opposite conclusion; moreo-
ver, there seems to be inconsistencies even within circuits.  For ex-
ample, the Second Circuit earlier in Torres and Duty, did not require 
specific warnings for waiver, but did so later on in Dallio.  In order to 
stop the large number of appeals based on challenges to the constitu-
tionality of a defendant’s waiver, the Supreme Court will need to re-
visit this issue in the future and give a clear ruling on whether specif-
ic warnings must be given by the court in order to determine that a 
defendant’s waiver passes constitutional muster. 
One solution to this problem is the approach followed by the 
Sixth Circuit, which requires its district courts to perform a formal 
inquiry prior to allowing a defendant to waiving the right to counsel.  
The formal inquiry approach could provide a specific procedure that 
would quickly identify whether the court performed its duty and sub-
stantially lessen the deluge of appeals due to claims of an invalid 
waiver.  This approach could lessen the arbitrariness of a court decid-
ing that a defendant knowingly relinquished the right to counsel. 
With regard to the cases that do make it to the appeals pro-
cess, the approach could reduce the additional time and resources 
spent on reviewing the cases to determine whether a defendant’s 
waiver was made knowingly.  It would be a means of unequivocally 
affirming that a court performed its duty of ensuring that a defendant 
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made a waiver knowingly.  Even if additional issues remained after 
the appeals court determined that the court performed the requisite 
inquiry, this approach would greatly expedite the process of address-
ing those specific issues. 
One weakness of this approach is that even if the formal in-
quiry approach were adopted, it would not resolve the question of 
how a court would determine whether a defendant’s waiver was intel-
ligently made.  However, even if it were not clear whether the an-
swers provided by the defendant clearly established that he was intel-
ligently waiving his right, the formal inquiry would still serve to 
establish that he knowingly did so, again, lessening the burden on the 
courts. 
IV. THE NEW YORK APPROACH 
Under the New York State Constitution, every New York citi-
zen who is accused of a crime has the right to “appear and defend in 
person and with counsel” in any court.185  Like the federal courts, 
New York courts must conduct a searching inquiry prior to allowing 
a defendant to proceed pro se in order to ensure that the defendant is 
making an informed, voluntary, and intelligent renunciation of the 
right to counsel.186  In order to ensure that the requirements of a prop-
er waiver are met, a New York court must apprise a defendant of the 
pitfalls and risks associated with self-representation.187  To achieve 
this goal, New York courts have permitted the use of a non-
formalistic, flexible inquiry.188  Under this approach, a court is not 
limited to a colloquy when deciding whether a defendant has properly 
waived his right to counsel, but has the broader capacity of examin-
ing the record as a whole.189 
New York courts have consistently upheld waivers of counsel 
where the court has conducted a proper colloquy and concluded that 
the defendant had knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived 
the right to counsel and chosen to proceed pro se. 
In People v. McIntyre,190 the New York Court of Appeals 
 
185 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
186 Crampe, 957 N.E.2d at 262. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. at 263. 
189 Id. 
190 324 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1974). 
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dealt with a defendant’s right to waiver of counsel and his corre-
sponding right to self-representation when the defendant was con-
victed of murder and robbery after being denied the opportunity to 
conduct his own defense with standby counsel.191  The court then in-
quired into his background, uncovering that he had attended college 
for one year, and at the time he was charged, had been working as a 
furniture designer.192  The court directed the defendant to be seated 
after he replied in the affirmative when asked if he thought his then 
attorney was competent to represent him.193  However, the defendant 
continued to respond after being ordered to sit down and eventually 
jumped out of his chair and knocked it over.194  The judge lectured 
him on proper courtroom conduct and after the defendant promised 
he would cooperate, formally denied his motion to proceed pro se.195  
The record from that court reflected that the defendant’s motion was 
denied because of his outburst, his statement that his attorney was 
competent, and the court’s general inquiry.196 
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, recognized the im-
portance of a defendant’s right to self-representation and concluded 
that the lower court had erroneously denied the defendant’s motion to 
proceed pro se.197  The court ruled that a court cannot deny a defend-
ant’s motion to proceed pro se if it conducts its inquiry in an abusive 
manner.198  Further, it decided that a provoked outburst would not 
serve to void a defendant’s right to self-representation.199 
In People v. Slaughter,200 the defendant was convicted of fel-
ony murder when a passenger in a car was killed after a collision with 
his car, following an attempt at robbing a warehouse.201  At a hearing, 
the defendant requested the removal of his attorney and assignment 
of new counsel.202  The court denied his application, stating that it 
 
191 Id. at 324, 325. 
192 Id. at 324. 
193 Id. 
194 Id. at 325. 
195 McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 325. 
196 Id. 
197 Id. at 328. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. 
200 583 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1991). 
201 Id. at 921. 
202 Id. 
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would be unfair because it was the middle of the hearing.203  On the 
last day of the hearing, defense counsel informed the court that the 
defendant had refused to speak to him.204  The court then advised the 
defendant that if he did not wish to be represented by counsel he 
could proceed pro se with counsel’s assistance.205  The court further 
advised the defendant that he could ask legally permissible questions, 
but would get no assistance from the court with regard to questioning 
witnesses or on constitutional issues.206 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that merely in-
forming a defendant that he would not receive any court assistance 
was not sufficient to satisfy the searching inquiry requirement.207  
With regard to the voluntariness of the defendant’s waiver, the court 
found that it was not the defendant, but the court’s repeated denial of 
the defendant’s request for appointment of new counsel that forced 
him to proceed pro se without the proper inquiry by the court.208 
Another case that was integral in defining New York’s ap-
proach to waiver of counsel is People v. Arroyo.209  In Arroyo, the tri-
al judge granted the defendant’s request to proceed pro se with his at-
torney as standby counsel, after only inquiring whether he really 
wanted to represent himself.210  The judge informed the defendant, 
“[Y]ou have a right to do it because I don’t think there is anything 
wrong with you.”211  On review, the Court of Appeals ruled that the 
waiver of counsel had been ineffective because the court did not ask 
the defendant “any questions” to ascertain whether he was competent 
to waive his right to an attorney.212  The court emphasized that the de-
fendant was not adequately warned about the disadvantages of pro-
ceeding pro se and the importance of representation by counsel in 
criminal adjudications.213 




205 Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d at 922. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 923. 
208 Id. at 924. 
209 772 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 2002). 
210 Id. at 1155. 
211 Id. 
212 Id. at 1156. 
213 Id. 
214 813 N.E.2d 632 (N.Y. 2004).  See also People v. Vivienzo, 465 N.E.2d 1254, 1255 
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the precedent that a specific set of rigid questions was not required to 
properly conduct the searching inquiry necessary for a proper waiv-
er.215  The court adhered to a totality of the circumstances approach, 
concluding that after reviewing the record, it was clear that the de-
fendant had effectively waived his right to counsel.216  The court ob-
served that the trial court had taken certain pertinent facts into ac-
count in deciding to allow the defendant to proceed pro se; namely, 
that the defendant had (i) “earned a GED,” (ii) had been a student at 
the “New York Restaurant School” at the time of his arrest, (iii) had 
been involved with the criminal justice system several times before, 
and (iv) was warned of the risks associated with self-
representation.217 
However, in People v. Smith,218 the Court of Appeals clarified 
that “a waiver-textured colloquy” was not enough to satisfy the 
searching inquiry requirement.219  In Smith, the defendant was con-
victed of “criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third de-
gree.”220  Throughout the trial he requested the appointment of new 
counsel and repeatedly informed the court that he was not prepared to 
represent himself.221  The court denied the defendant’s requests and 
the case proceeded to trial.222  During trial, his attorney was relieved 
after informing the judge that the defendant had threatened him.223  
Thereafter, the defendant continued with his own defense with his 
former counsel serving as a legal advisor.224 
 
(N.Y. 1984) (finding that the defendant properly waived his right to counsel because the 
lower court had determined that he had previously been involved with the criminal process, 
had discussed his decision with his attorney who advised him not to do so, had been warned 
that he did not have the proper training to defend himself and that most other defendants who 
had represented themselves had not succeeded in their defenses, and that if he chose to ig-
nore the advice and proceed pro se, he would be held to the same standards as an attorney). 
215 Providence, 813 N.E.2d at 635. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 633, 634. 
218 705 N.E.2d 1205 (N.Y. 1998). 
219 Id. at 1208.  See also People v. Kaltenbach, 457 N.E.2d 791, 792 (N.Y. 1983) (finding 
that the defendant had not properly waived his right to counsel because the court, instead of 
conducting a colloquy, had merely made declarations to the defendant that he had a right to 
an attorney, that he was facing a “serious charge,” and that if he was found guilty he could 
face a year in prison). 
220 Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1206. 
221 Id. at 1206. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 1206, 1207. 
224 Id. at 1207. 
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the waiver was 
improper.225  The court ruled that a defendant does not waive the con-
stitutional right to counsel because of a refusal of or refusal to work 
with his assigned attorney.226  Furthermore, the court clarified that a 
searching inquiry was not satisfied by: (i) the court’s urging that a de-
fendant proceed with his assigned counsel; (ii) the court’s observa-
tion that a defendant is probably better off being represented by 
counsel; nor by (iii) the court allowing defense counsel to standby 
and provide assistance, if necessary.227 
While New York satisfies the constitutional minimum for a 
defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel by requiring its courts to 
conduct a colloquy prior to a waiver, its less formalistic approach of 
achieving this minimum standard is in line with that of the Second 
Circuit.  As previously discussed, a less formalistic approach can 
have negative implications with regard to ensuring a valid waiver.  A 
stricter, more formal approach would more closely serve the purpose 
for which the right to counsel was developed—to counterbalance the 
prosecution’s familiarity with the adjudication process by requiring 
that an attorney assist the defendant with the necessary knowledge to 
defend against a criminal charge.  While it has been recognized that 
there should be an equally important right for a defendant to waive 
the right to counsel and proceed pro se, because the right to counsel is 
of such importance to our criminal justice system, there should be an 
additional safeguard of requiring that a specific procedure be fol-
lowed in order to provide some heightened level of protection for a 
defendant’s right.  Thus, a defendant should not be allowed to waive 
the right to counsel unless a strict procedure is followed and there is 
no disputing that a waiver was made knowingly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A review of the cases discussed herein warrants the conclu-
sion that the federal approach and the New York state approach to the 
question of a defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel are similar in 
that they both recognize that a defendant’s waiver must be made 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  The precedent set forth at 
both the state and federal levels requires that a court conduct a 
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searching inquiry prior to permitting a defendant to proceed pro se.  
Both approaches have established that only after the trial court has 
found that a defendant has knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel, may a court find a defendant’s waiver 
constitutional. 
However, the approaches differ with regard to the type of in-
quiry that is necessary to validate a waiver.  At the federal level, the 
circuit courts are split, with a majority of the circuits following an in-
formal approach, while the Sixth Circuit follows a formal approach, 
requiring that a set of questions be formerly presented to a defendant 
prior to waiver.  New York courts on the other hand follow an infor-
mal approach allowing inquiry to be based either on a series of non-
formalistic questions or on a review of the record as a whole. 
Despite the fact that different approaches are utilized when 
deciding whether or not to allow a defendant to waive the right to 
counsel, it is clear that both federal and New York courts recognize 
the importance of a defendant being represented by a trained counse-
lor-at-law.  The recognition of this basic right is a feature that sets 
America’s judicial system apart from that of many other nations.  The 
corollary to this right, which allows a defendant to waive counsel and 
proceed pro se, is yet another insightful aspect of America’s judicial 
system.  Though it is important to protect citizens from unfair prose-
cution by providing the default standard of representation by counsel, 
it is equally important in an impartial judicial system, if a defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waives this protection, he or she is al-
lowed to proceed pro se and be the author of his or her own destiny.  
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